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This study examines the association between financing strategies and firm
investments. Employing theory of financing constraints and literature on for-
mal/informal financing of small businesses to investigate a set of 15,851 obser-
vations of Vietnamese small businesses in 11 years, we suggest a pecking order
of financing strategies in terms of firm investments, in ascending order as fol-
lows: (a) firms using no external finance, (b) firms using informal finance only,
(c) firms using both formal and informal finance and (d) firms using formal
finance only. In addition, we incorporate the theory of social capital to explore
the moderating effect of networking on the relationship between financing
and investment. Empirical results show that networks may enhance the rela-
tionship between informal finance and firm investments but not formal
finance.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Investment is important to small businesses. Firms that
make investments may or may not grow. However, firms
that make no investment achieve no sustainable growth
and may even find it difficult to maintain their survival
in such highly turbulent and competitive markets
(Gupta, Barzotto, & Khorasgani, 2018). To finance invest-
ment projects, a firm basically has two financing options,
that is, internal and external. Only when internal funds
are insufficient, firms start seeking external debts to
secure their investment opportunities (Myers, 1984).
However, formal external finance (e.g., bank loans) is not
always accessible, especially to small businesses in less
developed economies because of issues related to market
failures.1 As such, informal finance, defined as small,
unsecured and short-in-maturity funding capital in this
study, appears to be an important alternative (but less
desired) financing source. Hoff and Stiglitz (1990) argue
that the existence of informal loans is driven by imperfec-
tions in the formal credit markets: banks ration bor-
rowers, and the informal sector serves those borrowers
who are rationed out by banks.
These arguments from the literature lend support to
four mutually exclusive financing strategies available to
small businesses, namely (a) using no external finance;
(b) using informal finance only; (c) using formal finance
only and (d) using both formal and informal finance. In
this study, we strive to explain the links between these
four financing strategies and firm investment decisions.
To be specific, the first research question to be examined
is that: how do dissimilar financing strategies determine
the values of investment in the context of small
businesses?
Received: 26 January 2020 Revised: 13 September 2020 Accepted: 16 September 2020
DOI: 10.1002/ijfe.2302
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided
the original work is properly cited.
© 2020 The Authors. International Journal of Finance & Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Int J Fin Econ. 2020;1–24. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/ijfe 1
It is important to understand the relationship
between financing sources and firm investments
because the recent literature has pointed out some coun-
terfindings to the conventional pecking order theories of
internal–external and formal–informal finance. For
example, Nguyen (2019) argues that external finance
may be more preferred to internal finance in insecure
institutional environments with high risks of appropria-
tion and corruption. In such a situation, entrepreneurs
are inclined to direct their businesses' internally gener-
ated funds to safer investment channels (e.g., savings)
and rely largely on borrowing to invest. Meanwhile,
Guariglia, Liu, and Song (2011) suggest that in small
business in China, thanks to their high productivity,
their cash flow is so abundant that they are able to grow
at a very fast rate, despite being discriminated against
by local biased financial institutions. Hence, well-
developed external capital markets may not always be
needed for fast economic growth. In addition, Wu, Si,
and Wu (2016) suggest that informal debt can be attrac-
tive to entrepreneurs because of its speed, subtle initial
transaction fees and freedom from collateral require-
ments. As such, some firms may decide to finance their
investments entirely by informal finance or by a combi-
nation of formal and informal finance instead of
switching completely to formal finance even when they
are eligible to do so.
These arguments evidently show the need to re-
examine the relationship between firm financing strate-
gies and firm investments. In addressing this issue, we
notice that social capital, defined as the number of
active contacts with business people, banking officials
and local politicians, plays an essential role (Du,
Guariglia, & Newman, 2015; Tran & Santarelli, 2014;
Zhou, 2013). The reason is that underdeveloped and
incomplete institutional environments in less developed
countries force entrepreneurs to strategically build and
maintain an active social network to gain access to
resources required to secure their investments. Social
networks exert a direct, non-financial effect on firm
investments (e.g., providing additional information,
business opportunities and collaboration opportunities)
(Ko & Liu, 2017; Shu, Ren, & Zheng, 2018) and an indi-
rect effect by moderating the relationship between
financing and firm investments. While the direct effect
of social capital is relatively well-understood, its indirect
effect is less clear (Heikkila, Kalmi, & Ruuskanen,
2016), especially when examining its moderating effects
on the relationship of a set of financing strategies and
firm investments. As such, the second research question
in this study is that: how does social capital influence
firm investments by moderating the use of formal/infor-
mal finance?
We investigate the proposed research questions in the
context of Vietnam, an ideal context for the following
reasons. First, as a post-communist economy, Vietnam
government still controls most of the key strategic
resources, including financial markets and land use
rights (Nguyen, Mickiewicz, & Du, 2018). Also, the insti-
tutional arrangements, including the financial systems of
the country, remain biased heavily toward the state sec-
tor (Nguyen & van Dijk, 2012). As a result, entrepreneurs
must dedicate to relationship building (social network-
ing) to seek external financing for their ventures in such
an environment. Second, Vietnam is an emerging econ-
omy characterized by the booming of the entrepreneurial
sector (young and small private businesses). They are the
key driver of the phenomenal economic transformation
of the nation in the last decade (Santarelli & Tran, 2016).
Therefore, it is essential to understand how they finance
their investments in such an adverse institutional envi-
ronment and the role of social networks in their financ-
ing strategies. Although a within-country research setting
clearly sets a boundary condition to our findings, such a
context of Vietnam allows us to identify the significance
of financing strategies and social networking to the
investment decisions of entrepreneurial firms, thereby
making relevant implications.
We take advantage of the unique information in the
Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) dataset conducted
by the Central Institute for Economic Management
(CIEM) of Vietnam. Specifically, we analyse more than
15,000 observations of small businesses in the period
2006–2018 to see how firm investment varies with differ-
ent financing strategies as well as the role played by
social networking in firm financing. To ensure the
robustness of the findings, besides the conventional
fixed-effects (FE) method, we also use bias-adjusted
treatment effects technique and general method of
moment (GMM) technique to reduce concerns with
potential endogeneity-related issues in the empirical
estimation.
Findings in this study propose a pecking order of firm
financing strategies in terms of investment. Specifically,
the pecking order in ascending investment values is as
follows: (a) firms using no external finance, (b) firms
using informal finance only, (c) firms using both formal
and informal finance and (d) firms using formal finance
only. We also find that social networks are able to
enhance access to informal loans and boost firm invest-
ment subsequently. However, we observe no evidence
showing that social networks, even networking with
bank officials, improve access to formal debts. Finally, in
a robustness test, we find that social networks are more
relevant to registered firm investment than to household
business investment.
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2 | LITERATURE AND
HYPOTHESES
2.1 | Financing sources and firm
investments
While the link between financing sources and firm per-
formance has recently attracted some research interest
(Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2010; Beck,
Lu, & Yang, 2015; Du & Girma, 2012), the theoretical
foundation that connects these two concepts is not clear
and relatively hard to establish. The reason is that there
are numerous mechanisms that play simultaneously. For
example, one mechanism could be that each financing
source is associated with different levels of monitoring
and contract enforcement, creating dissimilar degrees of
entrepreneurial commitment and inputs, hence influenc-
ing productivity and efficiency, and firm performance
ultimately. Another mechanism, which is discussed in
this paper, is the effects of alternative financing sources
on the values of firm investment that subsequently also
influence firm performance.
Our objective is to compare the investments of firms
employing different sets of financing sources. The first
pair of comparison is firms that use no external finance
and firms that use informal finance. However, difficulty
in comparing the investments of these two types of firms
is that firms that use no external finance could be a sum
of financially constrained firms and cash-abundant
firms.2 The former indicates firms whose internally gen-
erated funds are insufficient to support their investments
and that they need external finance but fail to secure
funding. The latter are companies whose internal funds
are sufficient to support their investments and that they
have no need to seek external finance.
If the number of cash-abundant firms dominates the
population of firms using no external finance, it is argu-
ably reasonable to expect that the group of firms using no
external finance are less financially constrained than the
group of firms that need to seek informal finance. As a
consequence, firms using no external finance are more
likely to make a higher investment than firms using
informal finance, on average. However, extant research
suggests that this scenario is less likely the representative
in reality, especially in developing countries. In fact, the
opposite hypothesis obtains more support from the litera-
ture that firms (which have no access to external finance
as such) that use no external finance are more financially
constrained than firms having access to informal loans
(Lebiere & Anderson, 2011; Nguyen, 2019). Also, Carreira
and Silva (2010) document some stylized empirical
results on firms' financing constraints. One salient fact is
that most young and small businesses are likely
financially constrained because they have yet established
sufficiently strong and trackable performance records,
which raise significant informational asymmetry con-
cerns for external lenders. For this reason, small firms
that use no informal finance are likely to be financially
constrained rather than to be cash-abundant.
In addition, small private businesses in less devel-
oped countries also encounter substantial institutional
biases, which cause severe financial resource constraints
(Allen, Qian, & Qian, 2005). For example, in Vietnam,
Van Thang and Freeman (2009) evidently show that the
greater the density of state-owned firms present in a
region, the more they enjoy favouritism, the lower is the
proportion of bank loans that go to private companies
and the longer it takes for private firms to get access to
land. While large companies can easily establish con-
nections with local authorities/moneylenders to secure
financial resources, small businesses can hardly join
into this circle because they cannot afford transactions
that are big enough to attract politicians/bank officials
(Du & Mickiewicz, 2016). For this reason, only a frac-
tion of small firms successfully obtains external loans
(Heikkila et al., 2016); and the majority of them are
likely to function in sub-optimal financing conditions
(Kislat, 2015). For example, in the context of Vietnam,
Rand (2007) using direct information from a Vietnamese
enterprise survey shows that between 14 and 25% of the
enterprises suffer from extreme credit constrained, and
these enterprises would increase their debt holdings by
between 40 and 115% if borrowing constraints were
relaxed.
Moreover, Hayes and Allinson (1994) suggest that
firms that use no external finance may suffer not only
from financing constraints but also from cognitive finan-
cial constraints—a situation in which a firm does not
obtain sufficient external funds to support its operations
primarily because of entrepreneur's cognitive style
(Lebiere & Anderson, 2011; Tyson, 2008). Specifically, it
describes the state of mind of many entrepreneurs run-
ning small businesses that constrains them from
requesting financial access, not because the funds are
unnecessary or inaccessible, but rather because of their
cognitive constraints. This type of entrepreneurship is
found popular in both developed and developing coun-
tries, and they will not actively seek out external loans
even if the financial constraint problems are mitigated
(Fraser, Bhaumik, & Wright, 2015). Specifically, in the
context of Vietnam, Nguyen and Canh (2020), analysing
a sample of 2,500 Vietnamese SMEs from 2005 to 2015
evidently show that individuals with cognitive financial
constraints originating from their background character-
istics (i.e., minor ethnicities, females) are less likely to
use external finance.
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In general, evidence from the literature seems to sug-
gest that small businesses that use no external finance
may not obtain sufficient capital to fund their investment
projects. Meanwhile, firms that successfully gain access
to external loans, including loans from informal sources,
may have overcome the cognitive constraints and have a
larger room of finance to fund their desired investment
projects. As such, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis H1a The investment values of firms gaining
access to informal finance are higher than the
investment values of firms having no access to
external finance.
The second pair of comparison is firms that use infor-
mal finance and firms that use formal finance. Informal
finance is of significant advantages like speedy and sim-
ple procedures, subtle initial transaction fees and free-
dom from collateral requirements (Wu et al., 2016).
However, informal finance is small, unsecured and short-
in-maturity funding capital, which may not satisfy firms
with long-term and/or large-scale investment projects.
Meanwhile, formal finance is the financing capital sou-
rced from banks and other formal financial intermedi-
aries. The key distinguishing characteristic between the
two is that formal finance lending is processed based on
hard information and arm-length principles while the
decision of lending informal finance is processed using
soft (private) information and relationship-based princi-
ples (Ayyagari et al., 2010; Nguyen, 2019).
Given this difference between the two, entrepreneurs
face trade-offs in deciding the appropriate source of
financing for their businesses. To maximize benefits from
borrowing, small firms are keen to match investment
projects to appropriate financing sources (O'Toole, Mor-
genroth, & Ha, 2016). To be specific, informal loans are
more preferred for urgent, short-term and small-scale
projects (e.g., to make up temporarily insufficient work-
ing capital) (Tsai, 2004). Meanwhile, formal (bank) loans,
due to their lower interest rate associated with higher
application costs, are more suitable to finance well-
planned, long-term and large-scale investment projects
(e.g., fixed-assets investments) (Ayyagari et al., 2010).
Empirically, Barslund and Tarp (2008), examining a set
of 932 rural household businesses in Vietnam, disclose
that formal loans are almost employed for production
and asset accumulation, while informal loans are used
for consumption smoothening. Also, from the viewpoint
of the specialization of the financial markets, Bao Duong
and Izumida (2002) reveal that in Vietnam, the formal
sector specializes in lending for production purposes,
whereas the informal sector's lending is quite diverse but
mostly associated with lower valued spending. Therefore,
it is expected that the values of investment projects
funded by formal debts are typically larger than the
values of investment projects funded by informal loans
only. Put it formally, we have:
Hypothesis H1b The investment values of firms gaining
access to formal finance are higher than the invest-
ment values of firms using informal finance only.
The next pair of comparison is firms that use formal
finance and firms that use both formal and informal
finance. To make such a comparison, we first need to
clarify the relationship between formal and informal
finance.
In fact, the extant literature offers different views on
the relationship between the two sources. One view is
that informal finance serves as the last resort for entre-
preneurs that are quantity-rationed in the more desirable
formal sector. This rationing may arise because formal
lenders have limited information and thus rely on collat-
erals to overcome moral hazard and adverse selection
intrinsic in credit transactions (Jain, 1999; Menkhoff,
Neuberger, & Rungruxsirivorn, 2012). Firms that fail to
provide sufficient collaterals are automatically screened
out and are forced to find informal lenders, who are due
to their informational advantages, and can substitute
information-intensive screening and monitoring for col-
laterals (Guirkinger, 2008). The informational advantages
of the informal sector (private moneylenders in particu-
lar) substantially reduce transaction costs which may
drive the effective cost of informal loans below the effec-
tive cost of formal loans. However, the price (i.e., the
interest rate) offered for the borrowers in the informal
sector (private moneylenders in this case) is typically
much higher than the price in the formal sector. Floro
and Ray (1997) explain this phenomenon citing that the
informal sector is regional; monopolistic or informal
lenders are likely to engage in strategic cooperation, thus
limiting competition.
In contrast to the ‘last resort’ view of informal
finance, there is another view that the informal sector
may also be preferred to the formal sector. Scholars
supporting this view typically cite funding from family,
friends and relatives as their research subjects. In the ini-
tial stage of the venturing or in urgent situations, these
informal funding may act as seeding capital or speedy
capital that satisfies entrepreneurs' need of capital with
low costs and flexible repayment schedules (Elston,
Chen, & Weidinger, 2016). In terms of private money-
lenders, Boucher and Guirkinger (2007) argue that they
have greater access to private information, enabling them
to write contracts that are more state-contingent than for-
mal contracts and thus are less risky for borrowers. As
4 NGUYEN
such, entrepreneurs that are unwilling to assume the risk
of a formal contract are inclined to seek informal finance.
Given these complementary/substitute viewpoints on
the relationship between formal and informal finance,
we suggest two possibilities. The first is that firms using
formal finance invest more than firms using both formal
and informal sources. This scenario is more likely when
entrepreneurs consider formal finance is the most desired
capital, and that they need to seek informal loans because
a proportion of their formal applications is rationed out
(Nguyen, 2019). On the contrary, another possibility is
that firms using both sources of finance invest more than
firms using formal finance only. This scenario is more
likely when entrepreneurs consider informal loans are an
additional financing option to boost their (different-sized)
investment projects instead of relying completely on for-
mal loans (Guirkinger, 2008). Based on this scenario, we
propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis H1c The investment values of firms using
both formal and informal finance are higher than
the investment values of firms using formal
finance only.
It is noteworthy that the opposite expectation that
firms using formal finance invest more than firms using
both formal and informal finance will also be tested.
Since the extant literature remains mixed and fragmen-
ted, and there is no dominant theory that leads to a clear
expectation from the two scenarios, we thus stay open to
explore the investment values of these two types of firms.
If hypotheses H1a, H1b and H1c are supported, we
are able to propose a pecking order of financing strategies
in terms of firm investments. Specifically, the pecking
order in ascending investment values is as follows:
(a) firms using no external finance, (b) firms using infor-
mal finance only, (c) firms using formal finance only and
(d) firms using both formal and informal finance.
2.2 | Social capital and firm investment
‘Social capital is defined as the structure of
informal social relationships conducive to
developing cooperation among economic
actors aimed at increasing social product,
which is expected to accrue to the group of
people embedded in those social relation-
ships’. (Hayami, 2009, p. 98)
This definition of social capital implies the role of social
relationships forged through informal organizations,
which could be horizontal (e.g., sports clubs) or
hierarchical (e.g., family members). These relations are
informal in the sense that they are not enforced by the
state's coercive power. And by social product, the idea is
to indicate the total value added from the use of social
capital. One of the key distinctions between human capi-
tal and social capital is that the former is owned and used
individually, whereas the latter is owned and used jointly
(Santarelli & Tran, 2013). As such, the faithful fulfilment
of the agreed-upon obligation (i.e., trust) is considered to
be an investment by network members in maintaining
social capital (Hayami, 2009; Zhan, 2012).
Social networking (Quanhe) as a business practice is
essential in Vietnam. Quanhe is an equivalent terminol-
ogy of Chinese Guanxi, which has more or less the same
meaning.3 The root of Quanhe, according to Dell, Lane,
and Querubin (2018), was established in the Sinic histori-
cal stage, which was heavily influenced by Chinese state-
craft. Specifically, in this period, Daiviet (former name of
Vietnam) citizens were ruled by a strong, centralized
state in which the village was the fundamental social and
administrative unit, leading to the establishment of
‘group identification Daiviet was governed by China dur-
ing the first millennium CE, and it maintained many fea-
tures of the Chinese state following independence'
(Meyer & Nguyen, 2005).
Quanhe, as a net of social networks, is found to exert
an important role in boosting firm investments (Bi &
Wang, 2018). There are two potential mechanisms lead-
ing to such a positive association, one is the direct, non-
financial effects and the other one is the financial effects
of social capital.
Concerning the non-financial effects, Cassar (2014)
argues that having frequently interacted with others in
the same industries would help entrepreneurs update the
newest trends in their markets, including both material
markets and product markets. By exchanging informa-
tion, entrepreneurs are able to build up a broader and
more complete picture of opportunities (e.g., new tech-
nology) and threats (e.g., new entrants) in their business
environments, which then enable them to pursue a more
informed and timely investment strategy (De Carolis &
Saparito, 2006). In the context of Vietnam, Hanh Tien
Thi and Tri Minh (2020) examine a sample of 153 Viet-
namese firms and show that social capital is positively
related to firm performance with knowledge transfer and
innovation acting as mediators. They also evidently dem-
onstrate that knowledge transfer and the company's
innovation are found to have a strong association with
each other.
In addition, a strong network associated with a high
level of trust may facilitate collaborative investments
among its members (Lai Xuan & Truong, 2005). In joint
ventures built on strong trust and mutual reliance, each
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party is likely to invest their most competitive resources/
advantages (e.g., knowhow) to increase the likelihood of
survival of the joint ventures, leading to higher value-
added and larger investment projects (Makino &
Tsang, 2011).
In addition to the external benefits, a wider and stron-
ger social network also benefits firm investments by facil-
itating entrepreneurial innovation. Baron (2007) suggests
that being exposed to new information is of important
effects in improving patterns recognition ability. Entre-
preneurs who have a diversified networking background
and experience are likely to come up with more innova-
tive ideas and plausible solutions. The reason is that a
diversified pool of information from different sources
allows ones to discover and connect meaningful events
which appear seemingly irrelevant to people with less
diversified social connections (Hsieh, 2016). For example,
Nguyen et al. (2018) examines a set of Vietnamese SMEs
(mostly household businesses) and find that entrepre-
neurs who have wider social networks obtained from the
previous entrepreneurial activities make more invest-
ments into their current ventures compared to first-time
entrepreneurs with no business network.
For these reasons, it is arguably reasonable to expect
that social capital, by providing small businesses with
valuable information, business opportunities and collabo-
ration opportunities, is positively associated with firm
investments. A hypothesis built upon these arguments is
hardly new in the extant literature. As such, we keep the
test on the direct, non-financial association between
social networks and firm investments in this study as a
confirmation test only.
2.3 | Social capital and financing sources
Besides the direct, non-financial association, social capi-
tal may boost firm investments by improving access to
external loans, thus reducing the adverse effects of
financing constraints on firm investments.
In terms of informal finance, Heikkila et al. (2016)
elaborate on the importance of relationship in gaining
access to external finance to argue that an individual's
social connections may affect access to credit through two
partly overlapping channels: social connections to loan
officers and the need to find guarantors for the loan. Since
stronger and wider bonding social networks reduce infor-
mational asymmetries, a person with more social capital is
indeed perceived to form a lower credit risk and thus
likely to obtain better credit access (Burt, 2007). This
strand of argument is endorsed by Chua, Chrisman,
Kellermanns, and Wu (2011) who argue that entrepre-
neurs must either use their personal capital or if personal
capital is lacking or insufficient, make use of other people's
social capital to successfully obtain external finance. As
such, they propose that family involvement increases a
venture's ability to borrow family social capital for the pur-
pose of obtaining debts. Meanwhile, Menkhoff et al. (2012)
investigate the financing of Thai small businesses and sug-
gest that most informal loans do not include any tangible
assets as collaterals. Instead, lenders enforce collateral-free
loans through third-party guarantees and relationship
lending. In the context of Vietnam, McMillan and Wood-
ruff (1999) examine relational contracting and find that a
firm trusts its customer enough to offer credit when the
customer finds it hard to locate an alternative supplier. A
longer duration of trading relationship is associated with
larger credit, as is prior information gathering. This strand
of literature thus highlights the importance of social capi-
tal in accessing informal finance.
Moreover, a strong and binding network reduces asym-
metric information and helps establish calculative trust
among its members. Therefore, an entrepreneur, when suc-
cessfully signals other ties in the network that he/she is
competent, may obtain corresponding favours (e.g., a better
trade credit scheme), which may then be used to finance
(a proportion of) new investment projects (Casey &
O'Toole, 2014; Cull, Xu, & Zhu, 2009). Trade credit and
reciprocal financial supports from local business communi-
ties are important to small businesses' investments, espe-
cially those operating in developing countries because of
their underdeveloped financial institutions (Cull
et al., 2009). Without such a system of networking and
mutual trust, the flow of informal finance among small
businesses would not have been successfully activated. For
these reasons, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis H2a The larger the networks associated
with a firm, the more positive the relationship
between informal finance and firm investments.
In terms of formal finance, Nguyen, Le, and Free-
man (2006) show that in the absence of effective market
institutions and business data, banks in Vietnam face
considerable uncertainties (rather than risks) in lending
to private small businesses. Consequently, banks employ
a combination of uncertainty avoidance, and reliance on
trust, in lending to their business clients. Given that
access to finance is crucial to making investments and
fostering growth, maintaining strong ties with bank offi-
cials appears to be a wise networking strategy. This argu-
ment is confirmed by Du et al. (2015) who demonstrate
that small businesses can improve access to (short-term)
bank loans by adopting strategies aimed at building social
capital, namely entertaining and gift-giving to bank offi-
cials in their social networks.
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In addition, it is noteworthy that the banking systems
in less developed countries are monopolistically controlled
by the states (Nguyen, Nghiem, Roca, & Sharma, 2016;
Saez, 2001). In such a weak and incomplete institutional
system (both formal and informal institutions), bank offi-
cials, empowered by substantial freedom from making
lending decisions, are keen to favour relationship-based
instead of arms-length principles of transactions with an
aim to seek private rents (Gjalt, Tu, & Hans, 2012). In such
a situation, networks can serve as a means to reduce trans-
action costs for bank officials. They are keen to make lend-
ing transactions with firms that are ‘in the circle’—that is,
having a well-established connection with them. The
reason is that bank officials face time and attention con-
straints, hence routine transactions are perceived cost-
saving and safer to extract rents and thus are prioritized
(Du & Mickiewicz, 2016).
Not only transaction costs but agency costs are sub-
stantially reduced by social capital. To be specific, net-
working serves as a mechanism of ‘information transfer’
in which firms can convey information about their reli-
ability and creditworthiness to bank officials (Zhan, 2012).
This should enable bank officials to build up a better pic-
ture of the financial and operating situations of the firms,
leading to a reduction in informational asymmetries and a
greater willingness to forward credit. For example, Le and
Nguyen (2009) show that in the context of Vietnamese
SMEs, networking with customers and government offi-
cials promotes the use of bank loans. This finding is
recently re-confirmed by Pham and Talavera (2018) who
investigate another set of Vietnamese SMEs and find that
social capital could facilitate loan applications: firms that
have a closer relationship with government officials and
other business people can get loans of longer duration.
For these reasons, firms with more social capital are
less financially constrained and are more likely to suc-
cessfully secure their investment projects. Therefore, we
propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis H2b The larger the networks associated
with a firm, the more positive the relationship
between formal finance and firm investments.
3 | DATA AND METHODS
3.1 | Data
To test the proposed hypotheses, this study employs the
Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) dataset published
by the Central Institute for Economic Management
(CIEM) of Vietnam. This dataset is obtained through a
collaboration of CIEM with two other institutions,
namely the Institute of Labor Science and Affairs of Viet-
nam (ILSAA) and the Development Economics Research
Group (DERG) of Copenhagen University.
The SME survey covers information on several opera-
tional aspects of small ventures in Vietnam, including
their production, sales structure, investment and employ-
ment. In addition to formally registered enterprises,
the survey also samples a substantial number of
micro-household businesses to gain a comprehensive
understanding of firm dynamics in Vietnam, where the
informal sector is particularly relevant (Carbonara,
Santarelli, & Tran, 2016). In addition to venture informa-
tion, household characteristics of the owner-managers
and their social network information are also extensively
surveyed. The first full investigation was conducted in
2005 and has been carried out every 2 years thereafter.
Approximately, 2,800 small businesses in 10 provinces
across Vietnam are randomly selected to participate in
each survey. In this study, we employ the dataset over an
11-year period, from 2005 to 2015 (six surveys in total).
It is noteworthy that this is an unbalanced panel as
some firms may exit and other new firms may join into
the surveys. The survey sample was drawn randomly
using the stratified sampling technique to ensure that an
adequate number of businesses with different ownership
structures was included for each province. We thus have
micro firms (the majority), private firms, partnerships,
cooperatives, limited liability companies and joint-stock
companies. For a comprehensive understanding of the
survey, see Rand and Tarp (2007). The SME dataset is
unbalanced and thus requires cleaning before using. Spe-
cifically, firms with no identification code and non-
meaningful accounting information were dropped.4
Moreover, the outliers are controlled for by censoring the
top and bottom 1% of observations in each variable, leav-
ing a final sample of 15,851 firm-year observations, cover-
ing 3,715 small businesses.
3.2 | Variables and measures
3.2.1 | Firm investments
The primary dependent variable in this study is firm
investments, measured by investment variable, which is
the ratio of a firm's investment value to its total capital
over a period of 2 years (due to the survey settings).
3.2.2 | Financing sources
The primary independent variable is a set of firm financ-
ing strategies. We identify four mutually exclusive
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financing strategies using the following two questions in
the survey: ‘Has your firm borrowed from banks or other
formal credit institutions since the last survey’? and ‘Has
your firm borrowed from informal sources including pri-
vate moneylenders, relatives and friends to owners and
other enterprises since the last survey'?
Firms that answer ‘no’ to both questions are coded
0, firms that use informal finance only are coded 1, firms
that use formal finance only are coded 2 and firms that
answer ‘yes’ to both questions are coded 3. As such, we
have a categorical variable with four potential outcomes:
(a) No external finance, (b) informal finance only,
(c) formal finance only and (d) both formal and informal
finance. It is noteworthy that the four dummy variables
are mutually exclusive.
3.2.3 | Social networks
We measure the levels of effectiveness of social capital
using the number of network ties that an entrepreneur is
effectively connected with. Specifically, we make use of
the following item in the questionnaire: ‘approximately,
with how many people do you currently (presently) have
regular contact?5 in each of the following categories:
(a) Business people in the same sector (same product as
the reported industry codes); (b) other business people in
a different sector; (c) bank officials (including both for-
mal and informal creditors) ans (d) politicians and civil
servants'.
As such, the survey provides information on three
types of social ties, namely business-specific networks,
financing-specific networks and political-specific net-
works. We construct a variable named social networks,
which is the sum of all social ties in these categories to
test the general effect of social capital on firm invest-
ments. In the robustness check, we also examine the
effects of each type of networks in details.
3.2.4 | Control variables
The model also controls for covariates that may influence
firm investments. At the firm level, it includes conven-
tional variables such as firm age, firm size, industry and
types of ownership. These variables represent the firm-
specific characteristics that significantly determine the
rate, value and frequency of investments (Nguyen, 2019).
Besides that, we also control for entrepreneurial-oriented
activities including exporting and innovating. The extant
literature suggests that entrepreneurial-oriented firms are
more likely to seek external finance to make larger and
higher value-added investment projects (Anderson,
Kreiser, Kuratko, Hornsby, & Eshima, 2015). Next, a vari-
able indicating firm membership status in local industry
associations is included to take into account the possibil-
ity that member firms may invest more than non-
member firms due to associations' provided subsidies
(Zhou, 2013). Also at the firm level, we control for the
level of liabilities (the ratio of liability values over total
assets), which are proven as a key determinant of
investment decisions (both formal and informal)
(Du et al., 2015).
At the entrepreneurs' individual level, the model
includes entrepreneurs' gender and age as control vari-
ables. These individual-specific factors play an essential
role in investment decisions because they indicate the
patterns of cognitive styles of entrepreneurs, which may
remarkably influence their ability to recognize and evalu-
ate business opportunities (Hayes & Allinson, 1998;
Riding, 1997). Moreover, individuals' previous start-up
experience and education may also affect their ability to
recognize business opportunities (Arte, 2017; Nguyen,
2018). Therefore, the model also controls for entrepre-
neur start-up experience and educational background,
which are measured by a set of mutually exclusive
dummy variables.
Finally, at the regional level, the model controls for
time-variant provincial consumption power. Firms
located in provinces with stronger consumption power,
measured as the average consumption value per capita,
may invest more than firms located in provinces with
weaker consumption power (Nguyen et al., 2018). We
also control for time-invariant unobservable provincial
characteristics using a set of corresponding provincial
dummy variables.
We acknowledge that it is important to control for
investment opportunities in an investment equation.
Conventionally, sales revenues were employed as a proxy
for investment opportunities (Guariglia et al., 2011).
Unfortunately, in this study, we do not have sale-related
variables. As such, we take into account the effects of
investment opportunities on investment decisions indi-
rectly using variables such as export, innovation and pro-
vincial consumption. Firms would not export or conduct
innovative projects if they did not observe sufficient
opportunities. Also, firms located in provinces with stron-
ger consumption power may find more investment
opportunities as well.
Variable definitions and summary statistics are
reported in Table 1. The correlation matrix is reported in
Appendix A (Table A1). On average, Vietnamese small
businesses invest more than 10% of total capital per year
in the study period. In terms of financing strategies,
34.4% of sampled firms use no external finance, 33.2%
use informal loans, 12.2% use formal debts and 20.2% use
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TABLE 1 Variable definition and summary statistics
Variable Definition M SD Min Max
Investment Ratio of firm investment value over total capital 0.103 0.206 0 1.308
No external finance Take value 1 if firms did not use external finance in the last 2 years
and 0 otherwise
0.344 0.475 0 1
Informal finance Take value 1 if firms use informal finance only in the last 2 years
and 0 otherwise
0.332 0.471 0 1
Formal finance Take value 1 if firms use formal finance only in the last 2 years
and 0 otherwise
0.122 0.327 0 1
Both financing sources Take value 1 if firms use both formal and informal financing
sources in the last 2 years and 0 otherwise
0.202 0.402 0 1
Social networks A count variable, indicating the number people that an
entrepreneur currently has regular contact with in the following
four areas: (a) business people in the same sector, (b) business
people in other sectors; (c) bank officials, including both formal
and informal creditors and (d) politicians and civil servants
32.512 30.470 1 203
Owner gender A dummy variable, which takes value 0 for female and value 1 for
male
0.640 0.480 0 1
Owner age Age of the business owners 45.652 10.481 25 73
Start-up experience A dummy variable, which takes value 0 if the current business is
the first venture and value 1 if the current business is not the
first one
0.026 0.158 0 1
Owner education A categorical variable, taking value 1 for doctoral degrees, 2 for
masters, 3 for bachelors, 4 for college degrees, 5 for professional
vocational degrees, 6 for senior technical degrees, 7 for junior
technical degrees and 8 for no degree
3.149 1.856 1 8
Firm age Number of years since firm establishment 19.087 12.857 3 86
Firm size A continuous variable, which is the natural log of the number of
employees (reported here the number of employees)
16.504 30.514 1 199
Export A dummy variable, which takes value 0 if firms did not export and
value 1 if firms have done exports since the last survey
0.062 0.241 0 1
Innovation A dummy variable, which takes value 1 if firms introduced new
products, or improved current products, or changed production
process, and 0 if firms did not do any of these innovations over
the last 2 years
0.375 0.484 0 1
Association A dummy variable with value 0 if firms do not join any local
industry association, and value 1 if firms hold membership in at
least one association
0.233 0.423 0 1
Liability The ratio of liability over total assets 0.096 0.189 0 1.078
Province consumption The value of average consumption of a province in a year
depreciated to 2010 value, in million VND per capita
27.553 22.841 2.451 89.120
Household business Takes value 1 for household business and 0 otherwise 0.653 0.476 0 1
Sole proprietorship Takes value 1 for sole proprietorship business and 0 otherwise 0.081 0.273 0 1
Partnership Takes value 1 for partnership business and 0 otherwise 0.003 0.052 0 1
Cooperative Takes value 1 for cooperative business and 0 otherwise 0.028 0.164 0 1
Limited liability company
(LLC)
Take values 1 for LLC and 0 otherwise 0.199 0.400 0 1
Joint stock company (JSC) Take values 1 for JSC and 0 otherwise 0.003 0.051 0 1
Joint venture with foreign
capital
Takes value 1 for joint venture with foreign capital business and 0
otherwise
0.033 0.180 0 1
Note: The statistics are provided for 15,851 firm-year observations from 2005 to 2015. The data source is the SME dataset published by the
Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM) of Vietnam.
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both financing sources. These statistics indicate that a
large number of small businesses (67.6%) in Vietnam still
have no access to formal finance, which may be a signal
of financing constraints. In terms of social networks, on
average each entrepreneur in Vietnam has 32.5 active
connections with business people, banking officials or
local politicians.
3.3 | Specification and estimation
Following the extant literature on small business invest-
ment (Nguyen, 2019; Zhou, 2017), we propose the follow-
ing reduced-form investment equation:
Investmentigt = β0 + β1 Financing sourcesigt
 
+ β2 Social networksigt
 
+ β3 Control variablesigt
 
+ vt + vj + vg + vi + μit
where i denotes an individual business, g is a province
and t a year. As such, Investmentigt is the investment
value of firm i in province g in year t. The term Financing
sourcesigt is a column vector of four financing strategies:
(a) use no external finance, (b) use informal finance only,
(c) use formal finance only and (d) use both formal and
informal finance. The term Social networksigt is the total
number of business-specific networks, financing-specific
networks and political-specific networks associated with
a business. Then, we also test the effect of each respective
type of networks on firm investments. The term Control
variablesigt comprises a set of covariates at individual
level, firm level and regional level that may influence
firm investments.
We are interested in the coefficients β1 and β2 as they
indicate the association between financing/networking
strategies and firm investments. We, moreover, aim to
explore the moderating effects of social capital on the
relationship between financing sources and investments.
As such, based on the benchmark specification, we
add an interaction term Financing sourcesigt × Social
networksigt.
The investment function also includes a time-specific
component vt, accounting for macro-business cycle
effects; an industry-specific characteristics vj and time-
invariant provincial characteristics vg, which are
controlled by the corresponding dummy variables. Firm-
specific time-invariant characteristics are captured in vi.
This study controls for this component by estimating the
equation using a fixed-effects technique. The fixed-effects
estimator could deal, to some extent, with unobservable
heterogeneity and potential endogeneity of missing
(time-invariant firm-specific) variables in the model.
Also, to reduce concerns of endogeneity, all variables that
may suffer from reverse effects are lagged 1 year. They
include firm size, export, innovation, association, liabil-
ity, financing sources and social networks. Finally, μit is
the idiosyncratic component of the error.
4 | RESULTS
4.1 | Main results
Regression results are presented in Table 2. The specifica-
tion tests indicate no serious issues with the modelling.
We also test multicollinearity among the regressors using
variance inflation factor (VIF) test and find no evidence
of its presence. Columns 1 and 2 show the results of
financing sources and social networks separately. Col-
umns 3 and 4 show the results of both variables entered
the equation simultaneously. The group of firms that use
no external finance serves as the benchmark.
The coefficients associated with financing sources,
including using informal finance only, using formal
finance only and using both sources of finance are posi-
tive and statistically significant. This finding initially
indicates that firms using external finance invest signifi-
cantly more than firms using no external finance.
To compare the investment between pairs of financ-
ing sources, we conduct a set of Wald tests. The test sta-
tistics (presented at the end of each column) confirm that
firms using formal finance invest more than firms using
informal finance. However, firms using both sources of
finance invest less than firms using formal finance only.
As such, hypothesis H1a and H1b are supported. How-
ever, hypothesis H1c is not supported. This finding thus
implies that entrepreneurs treat informal finance as less
desired alternative funding to formal finance.
In terms of the moderating effects of social capital on
the relationship between financing sources and firm
investments, column 4 shows that the coefficients associ-
ated with the interaction term between informal finance
and social networks and the interaction term between
both sources of finance and social networks are positive
and statistically significant. Meanwhile, the coefficient
associated with the interaction term between formal
finance and social networks is insignificant. This finding
thus implies that social capital is able to boost firm
investment by improving access to informal loans but not
formal debts. As such, hypothesis H2a is supported, and
hypothesis H2b is not supported.
Finally, the coefficients associated with the control
variables also reveal some interesting investment
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patterns. Older firms make more investments than their
younger counterparts. This could be attributed to
reduced informational asymmetries when firms grow
up. Also, firms holding membership in local industry
associations invest more, confirming the importance of
knowledge spillover and in funding investment projects
using external finance. However, liability seems to dis-
courage firm investments. This could be due to the
requirement from the creditors on high-debt firms that
restrict them from pursuing risky activities (i.e., making
investments).
4.2 | Robustness tests
4.2.1 | Household business vs registered
business
The sample of small businesses under investigation in
this study includes both household micro-businesses
and registered businesses. Specifically, 65.29% of the
sampled observations are household businesses, while
the rest 34.71% are registered firms. These two types of
firms may be different in their access to finance as
TABLE 2 Regression results
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Informal finance 2.834*** (0.413) 2.805*** (0.413) 1.970*** (0.568)
Formal finance 15.519*** (1.014) 15.529*** (1.015) 15.080*** (1.381)
Both financing sources 14.948*** (0.738) 14.907*** (0.737) 12.406*** (1.025)
Social networks 0.016** (0.008) 0.013* (0.007) −0.017 (0.011)
Informal finance × social networks 0.029* (0.015)
Formal finance × social networks 0.016 (0.030)
Both financing sources × social networks 0.073*** (0.023)
Owner gender −0.394 (0.597) −1.000 (0.622) −0.399 (0.597) −0.407 (0.598)
Owner age −0.034 (0.039) −0.032 (0.040) −0.035 (0.039) −0.037 (0.039)
Start-up experience 1.213 (1.455) 1.308 (1.510) 1.190 (1.458) 1.075 (1.462)
Owner education −0.163 (0.184) −0.143 (0.193) −0.163 (0.184) −0.140 (0.184)
Firm age 1.310*** (0.150) 1.079*** (0.155) 1.317*** (0.150) 1.300*** (0.150)
Firm size −0.678 (0.554) −0.685 (0.572) −0.677 (0.555) −0.601 (0.555)
Export −1.804 (1.723) −1.687 (1.752) −1.819 (1.723) −1.863 (1.722)
Innovation −0.395 (0.459) −0.460 (0.484) −0.399 (0.459) −0.408 (0.460)
Association 3.822*** (1.098) 4.838*** (1.137) 3.752*** (1.097) 3.606*** (1.095)
Liability −6.541*** (2.068) −7.383*** (2.170) −6.584*** (2.069) −6.600*** (2.067)
Province consumption −0.127*** (0.028) −0.147*** (0.030) −0.131*** (0.028) −0.123*** (0.028)
Observations 15,851 15,851 15,851 15,851
Number of firms 3,715 3,715 3,715 3,715
VIF 2.743 3.034 3.287 4.982
R2 0.479 0.425 0.479 0.480
Adjusted R2 0.274 0.200 0.274 0.278
Wald test informal finance = formal finance 156.65 61.53 90.68
p value .00 .00 .00
Wald test formal finance = both financing sources 3.46 5.30 5.07
p value .06 .02 .02
Note: The dependent variable is firm investment. Firms using no external finance serve as the benchmark financing source. All estimations
include full sets of two-digit industry dummies, 10 provincial dummies and 6-year dummies. SE and test statistics are asymptotically robust
to heteroscedasticity. Variables firm size, export, innovation, association, liability, financing sources and social networks are lagged one
period. VIF is variance inflation factor test for multicollinearity. Wald test informal finance = Formal finance under the null that the coeffi-
cient associated with informal finance variable is equal to the coefficient associated with formal finance variable. Wald test formal
finance = both financing sources under the null that the coefficient associated with formal finance variable is equal to the coefficient associ-
ated with both financing source. *indicates significant at 10%, **indicates significant at 5%, and ***indicates significant at 1%.
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well as networking activities. For example, micro-
household businesses, compared to formally registered
firms, may be more constrained in accessing to formal
finance such as bank loans as their natures of no offi-
cial records of accounting numbers and small scale of
economic activities (Elston et al., 2016). Also, the
networking activities of household businesses may
also be very limited due to their smallness and
unprofessionalism (Nguyen & Nordman, 2018). The
regression results on the two samples are presented in
Appendix A (Table A2).
The results show that both formal and informal
finance are important to firm investment, regardless of
their legal forms. However, the effect of formal finance is
much stronger than the effect of informal finance. These
findings are consistent with the main results on the total
sample. Interestingly, it is found that while social net-
works are important to registered firm investment, they
appear irrelevant to household business investment. This
could be explained by the fact that household businesses,
due to their non-professional management, may not uti-
lize their business networks efficiently, leading to limited
social capital extracted from the embedded networks
(Nguyen & Nordman, 2018). Also, their smallness in eco-
nomic activities may restrict them from making connec-
tions with key resource holders (e.g., higher level of local
authorities) (Du & Mickiewicz, 2016). For these reasons,
there is little correlation between networking and firm
investment in household businesses. Meanwhile, regis-
tered firms may strategically manage their social net-
works with an aim of increasing access to external
resources. Also, they may actively engage in political rela-
tionship building and extract benefits from such an
activity.
Turning to the interaction terms between financing
sources and social networks, it is found that network-
ing has no effect on access to formal finance in both
sub-samples. This finding is consistent with the main
results on the total sample. However, social networks
may help registered firms improve access to informal
finance. This effect is not found in household busi-
nesses. Once again, this could be explained by the
smallness in economic activities and unprofessional
management of household firms (Nguyen & Nordman,
2018). These characteristics fail to enable lenders to
build up a better picture of the financial and operating
situations of the firms, leading to significant informa-
tional asymmetries and a reluctance to forward credit.
Meanwhile, registered businesses, thanks to their for-
mal legal forms and professional management, may
find it easier to build relationship with lenders and
obtain informal credit.
4.2.2 | Four types of social networks
We also examine the effect of each type of social net-
works and the regression results are reported in Appen-
dix A (Table A3). The coefficients associated with the
four types of social networks are mostly insignificant or
even negative in the interaction specification. This could
be a result of multicollinearity due to the presence of the
interaction terms. However, the coefficients associated
with the interaction terms between informal finance and
social networks and the interactions terms between both
sources of finance and social networks are statistically
significant in some specifications. Meanwhile, the coeffi-
cients associated with the interaction terms between for-
mal finance and social networks are not significant in
any specification. These findings as such provide some
(weak) evidence that supports our proposed hypotheses.
4.2.3 | Endogenous networking
We acknowledge that the regression results presented in
previous sections may suffer from endogeneity-related
issues. For example, firms with stronger social network
have higher investment, but when firms make higher
investment, they have more chance to increase social net-
work through the investment implications. Also, even
though we controlled for several relevant covariates,
there may be a chance that the empirical setting encoun-
ters omitted-variable biases.
Therefore in this section, we employ the method pro-
posed by (Oster, 2019), derived from the work of Altonji,
Elder, and Taber (2005), to calculate a set of consistent
estimates of the bias-adjusted treatment effects. This
method is based on two assumptions: (1) a value for the
relative degree of selection on observed and unobserved
variables δ (normally assumed to be equal selection, that
is, δ = 1) and a value for Rmax – R2 obtained from a hypo-
thetical regression of the outcome on treatment and on
both the observed and unobserved controls.6 Using these
two inputs, an approximation of the bias-adjusted treat-
ment effect may be estimated through an examination of
the ratio of the movement in the regression coefficients
in relation to the ratio of the movement in R2.
The networking variables in the main specification
and the two sub-samples will be explored. Appendix A
(Table A4) presents the estimation results. Column
(1) shows the regression coefficients without controls
(baseline effect). Column (2) shows the regression coeffi-
cients with observable controls (controlled effect). Col-
umn (3) presents the bias-adjusted treatment effect with




which ~R is R2 obtained from the controlled specification
and _R is the R2 obtained from the baseline specification
(Bellows & Miguel, 2009). Column (4) presents the bias-
adjusted treatment effect with the assumptions δ =1,
andRmax = 1:3~R .
7 Column (5) presents the value of δ for
which the treatment effect becomes zero under the
assumption thatRmax = 1:3~R . To facilitate the calculation
of the non-biased treatment effects, we estimate the coef-
ficients in columns (1) and (2) using fixed effects.
The results show that the bias-adjusted coefficients
are all positive in total sample and in the sub-sample of
registered firms. However, testing ‘social networks has no
effects on household business investment’ generates a
value smaller than 1 for δ. This is a signal that the distri-
bution of the bias-adjusted treatment effect of the vari-
able includes value zero. This is consistent with the
finding using regression methods showing that social net-
works are irrelevant to household business investment
while they are positively associated with registered firm
investment.
4.2.4 | GMM estimation
In addition to the fixed effect, we also employ the system
general method of moment (GMM) to estimate the
regression coefficients. The GMM approach could deal, to
some extent, with potential endogeneity in our model by
using the lagged terms of the endogenous variables as
valid instrumental variables. Specifically, in the differ-
ence equations, we use the lagged 3- to 5-year terms to
instrument the endogenous variables. The specification
tests suggest that this length of lag is sufficiently deep to
reduce the correlation between endogenous variables and
the error terms, at the same time, to remain relevant to
the current terms of the endogenous variables (to be valid
instrumental variables). The system GMM, moreover,
corrects any possible finite sample bias by omitting infor-
mative moment conditions using differences as instru-
ments for level equations. In level equations, we use the
difference of endogenous variables lagged 2–4 years as
valid instruments. The regression results using GMM are
reported in Appendix A (Table A5) and in general consis-
tent with our key arguments.
5 | DISCUSSION AND
CONCLUSION
Investment is important to small businesses. However,
facing severe financing constraints, small businesses can
hardly satisfy their investment using only internally gen-
erated funds. As such, access to external loans is an
important determinant of investment decisions. This
study investigates the association between different
financing sources and investments of small businesses in
Vietnam. Using a panel dataset of 3,715 small businesses
in 11 years (2005–2015), we offer the initial empirical evi-
dence that firm investment is a function of financing
sources. To be specific, we propose a pecking order of
financing sources in terms of investment. The pecking
order in ascending investment values is as follows:
(a) firms using no external finance, (b) firms using infor-
mal finance only, (c) firms using both formal and infor-
mal finance and (d) firms using formal finance only.
We further observe that social capital is of essential
influence on firm investments. Its impacts are channelled
through two mechanisms. One is the direct, non-
financial effect on firm investments (e.g., providing
additional information, business opportunities and collab-
oration opportunities). The other mechanism is the indi-
rect effect by moderating the relationship between
financing and firm investments. Interestingly, we find that
social networks are able to enhance access to informal
loans and boost firm investment subsequently. We observe
no evidence showing that social networks, even network-
ing with bank officials, improve access to formal debts. In
other words, firms with more social networks are not sta-
tistically different from firms with less social networks in
terms of successfully securing formal (bank) loans.
This finding stands in sharp contrast to the majority
of the extant research in small business management and
entrepreneurship. For example, Du et al. (2015) examine
the extent to which Chinese firms can improve access to
external debts by adopting strategies aimed at building
social capital, namely entertaining and gift-giving to
others in their social network. They find that entertain-
ment and gift-giving expenditure lead to higher levels of
total and short-term debt (but not long-term debt). Bank
officers are exposed to higher levels of uncertainty in
long-term debt transactions as these loans are typically
larger in terms of value and longer in terms of the matu-
rity period. For this reason, social capital is insufficient to
protect bank officials from potential hold-ups or informa-
tion asymmetries occur after lending. This could be an
explanation for the insignificant moderating effect of
social capital on the relationship between formal loans
and firm investments.
This study sheds light on the debate about the rela-
tionship between formal and informal finance. This rela-
tionship has drawn substantial research but remains
elusive. Some studies propose a peeking-order relation-
ship between the two, in which firms will switch from
informal to formal finance as long as they are eligible to
do so (Lee & Persson, 2016; Rahaman, 2011). The reason
is that formal loans are more stable, secure and cheaper
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than informal loans. Meanwhile, other studies argue for
a complementary relationship between formal and infor-
mal finance because a combination of both financing
sources may best support firm diverse investment pro-
jects, in which some projects are more suitable for infor-
mal rather than formal debts (Kislat, 2015; Steel,
Aryeetey, Hettige, & Nissanke, 1997). In this study,
instead of simply examining the relationship between the
two, we propose and find evidence for a pecking order of
a set of financing strategies built on different combina-
tions of the two sources. Specifically, we propose that for-
mal finance is the most desired financing source.
However, firms do not completely switch from informal
loans to formal debts when they are able to do so, but
they need a transition period in which both sources of
finance are employed to make investments.
Moreover, this study also provides an initial under-
standing of the role of networks in the process of financ-
ing investment projects. We propose that on top of the
direct, non-financial effect of social capital on firm invest-
ments, there is another indirect effect of networks on
firm investments, that is, the moderating effect on access
to external finance. As such, this study adds to the discus-
sion on the importance of social capital on small business
management another dimension, that is the financial
effect of social capital.
This study has practical implications. The evidence
that formal finance is strongly associated with firm
investments suggests that policymakers in less developed
countries need to liberalize their biased financial systems.
Financing constraints are key obstacles to firm growth.
As such, some scholars have called for facilitating the
informal financial sector to mitigate the adverse effects of
financing constraints. We suggest that informal finance
can serve as a cushion for firms rationed out by the for-
mal sector. However, it has little contribution to firm
investments and growth subsequently. Therefore, build-
ing strong, well-regulated and unbiased formal financial
systems should be the ultimate goal of policymakers in
less developed countries (Saez, 2001).
Our findings also point to the importance of network-
ing in gaining access to external loans. Entrepreneurs
with stronger and wider social networks may find it eas-
ier to obtain informal debts. However, as we discussed,
informal finance contributes insignificantly to invest-
ments. As such, entrepreneurs need to be aware of the
costs (e.g., time, attention) and the benefits of their net-
working strategies. Overbuilt social networks may not
result in sufficient capital for investments but turn out to
be unproductive and inefficient (in terms of making and
maintaining social ties).
This study is not without limitations that should be
acknowledged, but they also provide potential avenues
for future research. First, the generalizability of this study
may be limited because the sample was restricted to Viet-
namese small businesses that are exposed to Vietnamese
management styles and local governance/institution
structures. Future studies, therefore, should extend the
proposed theoretical framework and re-test it in other
contexts. Second, the dataset employed in this study is
quite small (more than 3,700 firms) in a short period of
time (11 years, six surveys). Future research should thus
re-test the validity of our findings using a larger dataset
with longer survey periods. Finally, due to the limited
information available in the SME survey, we are mostly
restricted to the use of dummy financing variables in this
study. Future study may design questionnaires that cap-
ture count values of financing sources, which would
allow a deeper understanding of the impact of financing
strategies on firm investment.
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1 Market failures include moral hazard and adverse selection,
which is caused by agency costs. Moral hazard arises when
actions taken by entrepreneurs are unobservable by outside inves-
tors but bring about benefits to entrepreneurs at the cost of inves-
tors. Adverse selection arises when entrepreneurs have more
information than investors, making it difficult for investors to dis-
tinguish ‘good’ projects from ‘bad’ projects (Hechavarria, Mat-
thews, & Reynolds, 2016).
2 Carreira and Silva (2010) define financing constraints as the
inability of a firm to raise the necessary capital to finance its opti-
mal path of growth.
3 Guanxi is a social tie in which relative trust is high and is not
dependent on third parties (Burt & Burzynska, 2017). Guanxi
serves as a mechanism by which quasi-familial relations can be cre-
ated to cultivate trust among non-kin (Guo & Miller, 2010). This
type of social tie is specific to China and other countries in the
Southeast Asian region (Bian, 2017; Luo, Huang, & Wang, 2012).
4 Including firms whose employees are smaller than zero and fixed
assets are greater than total assets.
5 Regular contact is defined as ‘a contact of least once every
3 months, which you find useful for your business operations’.
6 If the outcome can be fully explained by the treatment and full
control sets, then Rmax = 1. However, in many empirical settings,
due to measurement errors for example, the outcome cannot be
fully explained even if the full control set is included.
7 The factor 1.3 is suggested by (Oster, 2019). This value is obtained
from an analysis of a randomized dataset of 65 articles. This value
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was selected because it allows 90% of the results published in pre-
vious studies (lab or field experiments) to survive the omitted-
variable tests.
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TABLE A3 Four types of social networks






















































































































































































































































































































Observations 15,851 15,851 15,851 15,851 15,851 15,851 15,851 15,851
Number of firms 3,715 3,715 3,715 3,715 3,715 3,715 3,715 3,715
VIF 4.383 4.092 4.396 4.984 4.365 4.212 4.964 4.224
R2 .479 .480 .479 .481 .480 .480 .479 .479
Adjusted R2 0.272 0.274 0.274 0.274 0.273 0.273 0.273 0.272
Note: The dependent variable is firm investment. Firms using no external finance serve as the benchmark financing source. All estimations
include full sets of two-digit industry dummies, 10 provincial dummies and 6-year dummies. SE and test statistics are asymptotically robust
to heteroscedasticity. Variables firm size, export, innovation, association, liability, financing sources and social networks are lagged one
period. VIF is variance inflation factor test for multicollinearity. Wald test informal finance = formal finance under the null that the coeffi-
cient associated with informal finance variable is equal to the coefficient associated with formal finance variable. Wald test formal
finance = both financing sources under the null that the coefficient associated with formal finance variable is equal to the coefficient associ-
ated with both financing source. *indicates significant at 10%, **indicates significant at 5%, and ***indicates significant at 1%.







Rmax = ~R+ ~R− _R
  Bias-adjusted
beta Rmax = 1:3~R
Delta for beta = 0,
given Rmax = 1:3~R
Networking (total
sample)
0.016 (.069) 0.013 (.131) 0.009 0.010 2.994
Networking (household
business sample)
0.006 (.066) 0.001 (.141) −0.003 −0.002 0.286
Networking (registered
firm sample)
0.028 (.078) 0.027 (.127) 0.024 0.025 9.027
Note: This table shows the bias-adjusted treatment effects for owner gender and female employee rate. Column (1) shows the regression coef-
ficients without controls (baseline effect). Column (2) shows the regression coefficients with observable controls (controlled effect). Column
(3) presents the bias-adjusted treatment effect with assumptions that δ = 1, andRmax = ~R+ ~R− _R
 
, in which ~R is R-squared obtained from
the controlled specification and _R is the R-squared obtained from the baseline specification. Column (4) presents the bias-adjusted treatment
effect with assumptions δ =1, andRmax = 1:3~R . Column (5) presents the value of δ for which the treatment effect becomes zero under the
assumption thatRmax = 1:3~R. The values in (.) are the R-squared.
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TABLE A5 GMM results





−9.180 (7.169) 2.867 (1.953) 11.829
(13.290)



























Social networks −0.009 (0.007)
Informal finance × social networks 0.020* (0.011)
Formal finance × social networks −0.007 (0.022)
Both financing sources × social networks 0.054*** (0.019)
Same business-specific networks −0.013 (0.010)
Informal finance × same business-specific
networks
0.014 (0.010)
Formal finance × same business-specific
networks
0.079 (0.097)
Both financing sources × same business-
specific networks
0.001 (0.013)
Different business-specific networks 0.004 (0.007)
Informal finance × different business-specific
networks
−0.005 (0.007)
Formal finance × different business-specific
networks
−0.025 (0.031)
Both financing sources × different business-
specific networks
0.023 (0.018)
Financing-specific networks 0.085** (0.038)
Informal finance × financing-specific
networks
0.263* (0.140)
Formal finance × financing-specific networks 0.713 (0.677)





Informal finance × political-specific networks 6.061* (3.198)
Formal finance × political-specific networks 0.564 (6.092)
















Start-up experience 0.829 (1.232) 0.406 (1.335) 0.705 (1.215) 0.534 (1.232) −0.546
(1.739)













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firm size 2.371*** (0.753) 0.254 (2.826) 1.948** (0.775) 0.130 (0.308) 0.227 (3.268)
Export 0.519 (2.423) 6.573 (5.831) 0.451 (2.152) −1.348 (1.165) −0.467
(6.068)
Innovation −0.312 (0.610) 1.834 (4.226) −0.180 (0.587) −0.353 (0.411) −0.464
(4.110)
Association 1.555* (0.917) 1.999* (1.143) 1.783* (0.928) 2.489***
(0.886)
1.531 (1.539)














Observations 15,851 15,851 15,851 15,851 15,851
Number of firms 3,715 3,715 3,715 3,715 3,715
VIF 4.346 4.345 4.657 4.335 4.753
Hansen J 0.015 0.259 0.021 0.064 0.824
AR(2) 0.104 0.313 0.604 0.379 0.202
Note: The dependent variable is firm investment. Firms using no external finance serve as the benchmark financing source. All estimations
include full sets of two-digit industry dummies, 10 provincial dummies and 6-year dummies. SE and test statistics are asymptotically robust
to heteroscedasticity. Endogenous variables are firm size, export, innovation, association, liability, financing sources and social networks.
These variables are instrumented by the lagged values. The instruments for the difference equation are the lagged 3- to 5-year level-variables.
The instruments for level equation are the lagged 2- to 4-year difference-variables. VIF is variance inflation factor test for multicollinearity.
Hansen (J) is over-identification test, under the null that the overidentifying restrictions are valid, the statistic is asymptotically distributed
as a chi-square variable. AR(2) is autocorrelation test under the null that there is no autocorrelation in the transformed equations. *indicates
significant at 10%, **indicates significant at 5%, and ***indicates significant at 1%.
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